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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
i)

Statement briefly indicating nature of case

The history of this properly in question begins in 1929. The Rogers' (the predecessor in title
to defendant Mr. Green, and, thus, Mr. Shook and Mr. Castle) purchased their property in 1928 and
Consuelo Weitz's grandfather (hereinafter referred to as the "Weitzes") purchased his property in
1929. There is evidence that indicates that the fence was in existence when both parties purchased
their respective properties. The fence line acted as a peaceful and mutually respected property
boundary through the Great Depression, World War 11, the Korean conflict, the Civil Rights
movement, the Vietnam conflict, over adozen presidencies, man walking on the moon, the telegraph
to the internet, from Frank Sinatra to MTv - thcn Mr. Green bought the Rogers property. As the
years evolved, the network of roads on the Weitzes side developed into a seamless, interconnecting
road system that serves all of the property north of the fence line which is the subject of this dispute.
The Weitzes lived upon their property and treated the disputed property as their own. The roads led
to their home. The fence line is clearly depicted on Plaintiffs Exhibit #1, which was actually
prepared by the defendants' surveyor.
[The defendants fall into two separate categories; Mr. Green who purchased the property
from the Rogers, and then Mr. Castle and Mr. Shoolc to whom Mr. Green later sold two separate
tracts of land after he subdivided the property into four (4) large tracts. As such during this brief I
will clarify as to whether I am referring to Mr. Green only, or the defendants collectively.]
Dairy cattle were run upon the disputed property, and, of course, the property north of the

fence line in question. The radio building upon the disputed property was built in approximately
1963 or 1964 and was used for many years thereafter, and it is still in existence today. Neither the
Weitzes' property nor that of the Roger's property was described for tax purposes in a metes and
bounds description. Rather, just historic quarter section descriptions were used based upon old
government surveys dating back into the 1800s, which did nothing to establish boundaries of the
various properties. Tr Vol. I, p. 655, LL. 5-1 1.
The Rogers and the Weitzes relied upon the fence as being the property line and lived by it
for the rest of the century.
In all of the years of the Weitzes' extensive use of the land in dispute prior to 2002, there has
been no protest from anyone regarding the Weitzes ownership activities, nor have any other parties
conducted any of these ownership activities of logging, road building and maintenance, granting of
leases or running of cattle upon the property north of the fence line which is the subject of this
litigation.
Mr. Green purchased the property from the Rogers, which is south of the fence line in
question, in July 2002 and this dispute began.
ii)

Course of the proceedings in the trial and its disposition

The proceedings in this matter were peculiar.
Mr. Green obtained title to what has been described as the Rogers property in July of 2002.
Mr. Green sold one tract of the land he purchased to Mr. Castle in February 2003 and another
tract of land to Mr. Shook in May of 2003.

Shortly after his purchase, Mr. Green, while carrying a firearm, confronted an individual on
the disputed property. Tr Vo1. I, p. 109, LL. 2-12. This, of course, led to lawyer letters going out.
Mr. Green professed surprise at the Weitzes' claim to the property north of the fence line that had
been there since 1929. Undaunted, Mr. Green immediately turned around and made claim against
the Rogers' family trust which had sold hiin his property. As described below in more detail,
Mr. Green settled with his predecessor in title, the Rogers, for the property in question ("the disputed
property") and accepted the amount of $46,427.16 for payment in regard to the properly that the
Weitzes have laid claim to. Mr. Green kept the settlement secret and continued to pursue his claim
as to the property in question against the Weitzes. The settlement with the Rogers, see Plaintiffs
Exhibit #10, was entered into on the 1st day of August, 2003. Mr. Green did not include either the
Castles or the Shooks as signatories despite the fact that he had already sold tracts of land to them.
He did not pay to the Castles or to the Shooks any of his settlement monies.
Unaware of the secret settlement with the Rogers, the Weitzes filed suit in February 2004.
The original complaint alleges boundary by agreement.
Charles A. Brown substituted as counsel for Ronald J. Landeck, the attorney for theplaintiffs,
the Weitzes, due to Mr. Landeck needing to testify about pre-coillplaint dealings with Mr. Green and
his counsel, Mr. Magyar, in the spring and early summer of 2003.
On June 10, 2005, Weitzes moved for leave to amend the complaint to allege adverse
possession and equitable estoppel. Despite the fact that the trial is still inonths away, no depositions
have been taken, and no formal written discoveryhad occurred, the court denies the Weitzes' request

to amend on the basis:
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion to amend. We have already had a
lengthy hearing on apreliminary injunction. I thought the pleadings were well set out
at that point. There was a determination made by a previous lawyer not to pursue a
claim for adverse possession. I haven't been shown facts, which, I think, set out a
valid claim for adverse possession nor do I think that equitable estoppel applies.
Tr Vol. I, p. 398, LL.l-8.
The surprising aspect to the court's ruling is that the proposed amendment to the Weitzes'
complaint is contained at R Vol. 11, p. 276, and it simply reiterated all of the factual allegations that
had already been made in the original complaint and simply added a paragraph alleging adverse
possession as contemplated by Idaho Code 5 5-210. Surprisingly, the factual allegations did not
change, but simply the legal cause of action. Regardless, the court denied the simple request to
amend the complaint.
The court also denied the Weitzes' request to amend the complaint to allege estoppel. The
basis for this motion was that not only had Plaintiffs Exhibit #lo, the secret agreement with the
Rogers, just been discovered by the Weitzes' counsel, but the Weitzes' counsel was in the process
of deposing Robert L. (Bob) Brower, the attorney for the Rogers, to investigate even further.
The court treated the Weitzes' motion to amend the complaint as if it were a summary
judgment in ruling:
As I read the document, the agreement between the Rogers Trust and the Greens,
it indicates to me that Rogers Trust had a legal obligation to defend the title. That
for the reduction in the purchase price, Greens assume the obligation to defend the
title. Now whether that turns out to be awise financial move or a disastrous financial
move has yet to be seen. But I don't think in the transference of that risk, the Greens

are equitably estopped from anything.
Tr Vol. I, p. 398, LL. 9-17.
Thus, in one fell swoop the court denied the motion to amend the complaint. In doing so,
it treated the simple motion to amend as if it were a motion for summary judgment but without the
benefit of briefing, affidavits, or evidence. Mr. Brower's deposition, the attorney for the Rogers,
had not even been taken yet so as to glean Mr. Green's secret agreement with the Rogers and the
surroundingfacts. (See Plaintiffs Exhibits #44 thru #5O for the exchange of correspondencebetween
Mr. Brower and Mr. Green's attorney, Mr. Magyar, which clearly indicates Mr. Green accepted
payment on a per acre basis for the very property to which the Weitzes were laying claim.)
Again, no depositions had yet been taken. From the time when the Weitzes made their
motion to amend to the date of the trial, over 13 depositions were taken of the parties and witnesses.
(Some depositions were taken of people who were never even called to testify.) It was even after
the ill-fated motion to amend that counsel and the court traipsed across the property to view it for
the first time.
Weitzes' counsel, afier being denied the right to amend the complaint, garnered together
additional "facts" and again renewed the motion to amend, and was, again, denied by the court and
in so doing, the court created a new rule of procedure for the amendment of pleadings:

. . . And that's, I think, terribly disturbing to me from my prospective [sic] because
while I acknowledge that the rules of amendment are liberal, I think it, in this
instance, would result in a very dramatic change in the tactic and reward the change
in lawvers, which I'm not sure the rule even colltemplates.

Tr Vol. I, p. 514, LL. 23-25; p. 515, LL. 1-3 (emphasis added).
Huh?
Strangely enough, the court granted the motion to amend the complaint as far as estoppel on
September27,2005, at the pretrial conference and entered its order on October 3,2005 -the first day
of trial. R Vol. VII, p. 1264,
As to the adversepossession claim, the court implied it would be a radical change in direction
by the Weitzes with their new counsel, but the court in its initial Memorandum Decision, found facts
that totally supported an adverse possessiou claim:
The Weitz family claims ownership ofthe disputed property because of Consuelo
Weitz's family history and association with the property. Mrs. Weitz's father, Harold
Schoepflin, and her grandfather, Fred Schoepflin, previously ran dairy cattle on the
disputed property. It appears this was done until about 1975. Prior to that time the
Schoepflins treated the disputed property as their own. They graded the trail in
question at will and connected it with numerous other roads traversing their property
to the north. They maintained the fence, which encroached on the Rogers' property.
Duringthe 1970'sHomer Ferguson leased the Rogers' properly fromlnez Rogers, the
Rogers' family matriarch, to run cattle on it. Mr. Ferguson testified that Mrs. Rogers
told him in the mid-1970's that the fence, which borders the disputed property,
constituted the boundarybetween the Schoepflin's property and the Rogers' property.
R Vol. VI, 1x1352
Thus, the court finds that a clear case of "adverse possession" occurred at least up until 1975
and, thus, title transferred as of that date.
Another strange aspect to the denial ofthe motion to amend was that the case was set for a
court trial - not a jury trial, and the denial of the motion to ainend was that previous counsel,

Mr. Landeck, had plead prescriptive easement, which is almost identical in its elements with that of
adverse possession.
As to the defendants' counterclaims, the court did not award the defendants $184,000 worth
of damages as they contended, but rather the court came in with its own measure of damages of $500
each. The court then refused to treble that amount due to the fact that any alleged "trespass" by the
Weitzes was not intentional as contemplated by Idaho Code § 6-202.
The court, in its initial Memorandum Decision, summarily denied defendants' claim for
slander of title. R Vol. VI, pp. 1349-1360.
Strangely, eight (8) months afrerthe trial and without additional testimony, the court awarded
$40,000 for slander of title. R Vol. VIII, p. 1655. Thereby, reversing its previous ruling on January 9,
2006:
The final issue remaining for decision is the claim by the Castles, Greens, and
Shoolcs that the title to their property has been slandered by the Weitz family. There
are four essential elements to a slander of title action. These include: "(1) The
uttering and publication of the slanderous words by the defendant [sic]; (2) the falsity
of the words; (3) malice, and (4) special damages . . . ." Matheson v. Harris, 98
Idaho 758, 759, 572 P.2d 861, 862 (1977). Based on the evidence presented. this
Court cannot conclude that the Weitz family was, in anv wav, malicious with regard
to its statements. The Weitz family had a good faith belief it had a valid claim to the
disputed property. Consequently malice has not been shown.

R Vol. VI, pp. 1359-1360 (emphasis added)
iii)

Factual statement

The fence that was used to divide the properties and corral the cattle was a relatively straight
fence line that was repaired or reconstructed over the many years it existed. The fence was attached

to substantial trees that grew in substance more and more as the years went by, and within the fence
line on the Weitzes' side, an intricate road system evolved. The Weitzes used the disputed property
not only for their cattle, but also for recreation and logging purposes, and they even went so far as
to lease the property to others. In 1963, a 10-year lease was entered into with the County of Latah
and the City of Moscow to allow for the establishment of a radio station building which was then
recorded as Instrument No. 223360 with Latah County. The lease specifically stated:
It is hereby agreed by the first party that he will erect on said leased premises a
radio receiving and sending station, said radio receiving and sending station to
comply with Federal Communications Commission regulations and said radio
receiving and sending station to be operated by the Latah County Sheriffs Office and
the Moscow. Idaho Police Devartment.
It is agreed and understood between these parties that the building in which said
radio receiving and sending station shall be installed will be placed on said premises
at the sole expense of the first party and it is further understood and agreed that the
equipment to be placed in said building is to be provided by the second parties and
that the cost of installing said equipment is to be paid by the second parties to the
first party.
It is agreed and understood between these parties that the first party will make
arrangements with the Washington Water Power for the building of a power line to
said premises and for necessary access roads to said premises, but the second parties
will assist in such arrangements if such assistance becomes necessary.
Plaintiffs Exhibit #24, first page (emphasis added).
The telephone wires were run to the radio station building and, in order to reach the building,
a swath had to be cut through the trees located on the property in order to access the building. See
Defendants Exhibit #AA. Thus, the lease not only contemplated that Latah County and City of
Moscow recognize the disputed property as belonging to the Weitzes, but that the access road and

building were also upon the Weitzes' property. The CountyiCity's deputies or employees were
obviously traversing the Weitzes' property (i.e. the disputed property) and using the Weitzes'
property in order to operate the radio station as the years went by.
Plaintiffs Exhibit #40-B is a 1983 aerial depiction o f how the property looked on that date.

An overlay is placed upon the aerial to show how the Rogers' use o f the property stopped at the
disputed fence. North o f the fence line was where the Weitzes' possession, ownership, and control
commenced. One can see in viewing the property south o f the disputed fence line, the Rogers'
property, that the property had been logged up to the disputed fence line, and after logging the
property had also been used to graze cattle. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 1409-1410)
The Weitzes' use o f the disputed property for recreation included snowmobiling, hiking,
firewood collection,picnicking and other family activities. The Weitzes installed a huge blue metal
gate on the eastern boundary o f their property.
The nature o f the use o f the property by the Weitzes north o f the disputed fence line and by
the Rogers south o f the disputed fence line varied dramatically. As noted by the court above, the use
by the Weitzes included dairy farming up until 1975. But, now look at Plaintiffs Exhibit #40-B to
again see how the forestry practice o f the Rogers below the disputed fence line in question was
significantly different than that o f the Weitzes north o f the disputed property line. The testimony
presented at Tr Vol. 11, pp. 1412-1414 captures some o f this distinction.
The Weitzes' use and ownership o f the disputed property remained unquestioned and
uninterrupted until Mr. Green purchased his property in 2002, which once belonged to the Rogers.

Before Mr. Green purchased the Roger's property, he was very careful to place blinders on
his eyes and adjust them carefully. He testified that he did not even notice the swath that had been
cut through the timber going westerly and had been visible for decades (Tr Vol. II, p. 1194, L. 4)
despite having to admit that he did take notice o f the radio shack. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1196, L. 24.
Mr. Green had even had the property surveyed, and upon the survey, the surveyor had located the
fence line in question. See Plaintiffs Exhibit # l . Mr. Green admitted that prior to the date o f
purchase he had been upon the disputed property and had traversed the fence line in question
numerous times. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1216, LL. 1-25.
Q.

And you -- when I aslted you those questions, you didn't then say, what fence
line, what are you talking about or anything like that, you indicated under
oath that you traversed that fence line a number o f times prior to date o f
purchase; isn't that right?

A.

Yes.

Tr Vol. II, p. 1217, LL. 8-13.
Mr. Green admitted that he lived in the Viola area since 1995, which is where the property
in question is located. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1116, LL. 24-25.
Mr. Green admitted that prior to the purchase he had been upon the disputed property many
times and had usually accessed it through the large blue steel gate. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1117, LL. 22-24.
See PlaintiffsExhibits #36-A thru C for pictures o f the steel blue gate. Mr. Green further admits that

he drove the disputed road prior to his purchase o f the property using his ATV, Polaris 500, with a
wheelbase ranging from 46 inches to 48 inches. Tr Vol. II, p. 1118, LL. 1-25. Mr. Green's testimony

jumped around considerably but finally he was able to be nailed down:
Q.

(BY MR. BROWN) And then the question was asked, before making that
purchase, did you go up and examine the land that you were considering
purchasing? Your answer was what? Go ahead and read it out loud.

A.

I said, I started probably in 1999,2000 going up there to view the property.

Q.

Okay, and would you describe for us what you did to view the property over
those years and how many trips you made?

A.

I probably made at least 25,30 trips up there. I was four wheelin', used my
four wheeler from the top of Moscow Mountain to come in with access
through the blue gate, walk the property, ride the property.

Q.

So, does that refresh your memory as far as the number of times that you
made -trips that you made to that disputed property area?

A.

Sure.

TrVol. II,p. 1123, LL. 22-25:p. 1124, LL. 1-13.
Mr. Green's trial testimony revealed that he was very careful as to his conversations with the
previous property owner, Mr. Rogers. In regard to conversation as to the property boundary
Mr. Green stated, " I never asked him." Tr Vol. II, p. 1128, L. 3. How convenient.
Despite living in the area since 1995, Mr. Green was careful not to have conversations with
any of the surrounding neighbors concerning the boundary of the property in question.
Q.

Did you have a conversation with -prior to August lst, 2002 -with anyone
as to where the northern boundary was of the property you intended to
purchase froin the Rogers prior to August lst, 2002?

A.

No.

Tr Vol. 11, p. 1128, LL. 15-19.

Not only was the Weitzes' property immediately adjacent to the disputed property, the two
pieces of property were searnlessly integrated. But, Mr. Green did not feel the need during his 25
to 30 visits to the property to simply drive his ATV down the road to the Weitzes' home and make
inquiry concerning the northern boundary ofthe property he was going to purchase. Consuelo Weitz
was upon the property throughout her entire life. In 2002 she lived just down the hill from the steel
blue gate that Mr. Green used to access the property. Mr. Green could have easily driven down to
her home, made inquiry with her concerning the history of the property in question, and he would
have been fully informed as to the blue steel gate, the radio shack, the roads, the disputed fence, the
large yellow barrel with a pole sticking out of it, etc., etc. Mr. Green, had he made any inquiry with
the previous owner, Mr. Rogers, would have discovered that an individual named
Mr. Homer Ferguson leased the Rogers' property.
Mr. Homer Ferguson was called as a witness and testified that he raised cattle and horses on
the Rogers' property from 1970 to 1975. Tr Vol. I, p. 894, L. 4. Mr. Ferguson used the fence line
that had been established prior to 1929 as the northern boundary because:
A.

I was told that was the boundary line and it was my responsibility to keep the
fence intact.

Q.

Who told you that?

A.

Mrs. Rogers.

Tr Vol. I, p. 895, LL. 3-9.
Q.

Could you describe the fence to the best of your ability, could you describe
the fence as far as straightness, whatever, I'm trying not to -

A.

Well, it looked very straight to me. I -- I was impressed with how straight it
was because frequently these fences are built to convenience, but I have been
-- I was told at the time that it was a property boundary line and that's the
way it was built very straight. It was a three-wire fence and I remember that
yellow barrel being filled with rocks and it had a post in the middle, it was in
a place where it was difficult to put a post.

Tr Vol. I, p. 898, LL. 4-15.
Mr. Green was carehl, he testified, to not even bother walking the boundary of the property
he was going to purchase with the realtor. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1129, LL. 6-1 1.
Mr. Green testified that he even had a surveyor come to the properly in question and that he
had their realtors place a couple stakes

a on the southern property line, so as to conveniently

ignore the northern property line. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1129, LL. 21-24. Mr. Green is equally careful to
avoid making inquiry concerning the radio shack.
Q.

In regards to the radio shack, I want to make sure we're clear, the
dialogue's clear, that it's my understanding in regards to the radio
shaclc building, you didn't make any inquiry concerning its history,
who owned it, why it was there, anything else prior to August lst,
2002; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Tr Vol. 11, p. 1132, L. 13-19.
Mr. Green admits that prior to purchasing the property he had contact with three surveyors:
Mr. Monson, Mr. Hodge, and Mr. Taggart (Tr Vol. II, pp. 1128-1132). However, he still did not
bother to locate the northern boundary line or make inquiry in regard to the road on the disputed
property upon which he rode his ATV. He did not make inquiry in regard to the history involving

the radio shack. He did not make inquiry in regard to the fence that he had traversed on numerous
occasions. He did not make inquiry in regard to the large blue steel gate he used to access the
property in question. He did not make inquiry in regard to the huge swath cut through the trees that
allowed the telephone lines to go to the radio shack.
Ignorance is bliss.
Mr. Green's ignorance only goes so far. Before he sold the property to Mr. Shook and
Mr. Castle, the co-defendants, he was careful to enter into a carefully constructed agreement to
protect himself in case there was a challenge to the boundary. See Plaintiffs Exhibits #8 & #9.
Mr. Green's agreement with Danial T. Castle and Catherine C. Castle reads, in part, as
follows:
4. . . . By this agreement, the Greens will take the following action regarding a
potential adverse possession claim. ShouldDr. &Mrs. Weitz proceed with an action
that results in the loss of any portion of Tract 1 (sum total equally 48 acres), the
Greens will compensatethe Castles in the amount of $4000 per acre for losses within
7 days of final judgment.
Plaintiffs Exhibit #8 (emphasis added).
The agreement with Steven R. Shook and Mary E. Silvernale Shook, Plaintiffs Exhibit #9,
reads similarly but has the price of $4,745.82 per acre.
It should be noted that as described above, the court, in denying the Weitzes' motion to
amend their complaint to allege adverse possession, saw it as a dramatic change of tactics. The
Greens were fully aware that the Weitzes fully intended to pursue an adverse possession claim.
Again, it should be noted that once Mr. Green had himself protected with the two agreements, with

the Castles and Shooks, then he reached settlement with the Rogers.
Mr. Green's cleverness was only exceeded by his greed.
Prior to the initiation of litigation by the Weitzes, the typical lawyer letters were exchanged.
Mr. Green took this opportunity to make demand upon the previous titleholders, the Rogers, and
obtained a settlement for the infringement upon the northern boundary lot line due to what the
Weitzes were alleging existed. Mr. Green's settlement with the Rogers provided that Mr. Green was
to receive the sum of$46,247.16. See Plaintiffs Exhibit #lo. Mr. Green was represented by attorney
RobedMagyar from Moscow, Idaho, and the Rogers Trust was represented by Robert (Bob) Brower,
an attorney from Lewiston, Idaho. Their exchange of letters is reflected by Plaintiffs Exhibits #45

thru #50. Exhibit #48 has to be looked over with particular care. It becomes plainly and explicitly
clear that Mr. Green was paid the amount of $46,247.16 to cover a discount for the property that the
Weitzes were laying claiin to. This document was discovered by counsel for the Weitzes before
trial, and, thus, that is why a motion to amend the complaint was made in regard to estoppel.
But Mr. Green's greed continued unabated. He wants his cake and eat it too.
Prior to the litigation, the Weitzes had the fence, which had fallell into disrepair, repaired.
In doing so, the individual who did the work removed some underbrush, cut through some saplings,
and a mishmash of undergrowth. In this, Mr. Green alleges damages in excess of $180,000.
Mr. Green attempted to pump up his damages by using a replacement cost analysis in regard to the
foliage that was removed by the person repairing the fence. Unfortunately for Mr. Green, the expert
he called did not substantiate Mr. Green's allegations.

Mr. Thomas Richards was an expert who was ostensibly called to substantiate the lost of
foliage, Tr Vol. 11, pp.1553-1670. His testimony did not go as planned. He testified openly and
honestly that the growth that was on the hillside in question was "submerchantable" and
"nonrnarketable." He also testified that it would be impossible to replace such suppressed growth,
"unwise," and "stupid" to do so. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1642.
Mr. Richards' testimony essentially established that the damages that the defendants were
attempting to recover, in excess of $180,000, essentially for undergrowth that would be fuel for any
forest fire, 'and would be "stupid" to replace.
As could be anticipated, the trial court did not award the defendants their alleged damages,
but rather arrived at $500 per defendant for an unexplained reason.
Initially as noted above, the trial court found that the Weitzes had been on the property since
1929 and had truly and honestly thought that they owned the property up to the disputed fence line.
The defendants had counterclaimed for slander of title on the basis that the very bringing of the
lawsuit to quiet title somehow constituted slander of title. The court in its original opinion, dated
January 9,2006, summarily denied relief for that counterclaim on the basis that no "malice" could
possibly exist for the Weitzes simply filing a quiet title action.
Then, in June 2006 the court reversed itself without reopening the trial and declared
summarily that a slander of title apparently does exist and awarded $40,000 as damages against the
Weitzes.
The Weitzes in their complaint did seek to quiet title in the disputed property by asserting

a claim of boundary by agreement. The court in its Memorandum Decision denies this claim, but
in denying the claim sets forth sufficient findings to actually establish the claim. The court found:
The Weitz family seeks to quiet title in the disputedproperty by asserting a claim
ofboundary by agreement. In order to establish a boundary by agreement, the Weitz
family must establish two things by clear and convincing evidence.' First, they must
prove an uncertain or disputed boundary involving adjacent properties; and second,
they must prove a subsequent express or implied agreement fixing the boundary. Cox
v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495,50 P.3d 987,990 (2002) (citing Gviffel v. Reynolds,
136 Idaho 397,400,34 P.3d 1080,1083 (2001)).
Clearly there exists in this case a disputed boundary involving adjacent properties.
However, as to the express or implied agreements, the Weitz family's has failed to
make its case by clear and convincing evidence. In 1988, the Idaho Department of
Lands put up a marker on the northeast comer of the Rogers' property. That
boundary marker constituted notice that the true property line between the Weitz
family property and the Rogers' property was north of the fence in question. Thomas
Rogers, the Rogers' family's property manager, testified that the boundary was not
the dilapidated fence, but rather the comer established in 1988 by the Idaho
Department of Lands. The only testimony that the Rogers family agreed to the
boundary was the thirty-year old statement attributed to Mrs. Rogers, who apparently
had little familiarity with property.
Todd Green, in trying to find property to purchase, located the comer that had
been placed by the Idaho Department of Lands. The fence, which the Weitz family
relies on, was, in 2002, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. In the summer of
2005, when this Court walked the length of the "fence," it would have been inore
descriptive to have referred to it as the vemains of a fence than to refer to it as a
"fence." It must have been many years between the time this Court observed the
"fence" and the time it served as a barrier to roaming cattle. As between the "fence"
and the quarter section marker placed by the Idaho Department of Lands, the latter
served as notice to the world where the true property boundary lay; the "fence" would
not have constituted notice of anything to anyone. Consequently, the Weitz family's
claim to a boundary by agreement fails.
R Vol. VI, pp. 1353 - 1354.
What the court fails to discuss is the fact that the boundaryby agreement didnot start in 2002

when Mr. Green purchased his property, but rather in 1929 when the Rogers and the Weitzes
(Schoepflin) were uncertain of where the boundaries laid. As a matter of fact, when they purchased
their property, it was purchased with the fence already in place, and the Weitzes then continued to
use the property north of the fence line from 1929 onward as if it was the boundary and the Rogers
did the same. This conduct manifested the parties' desire and intent as follows:

.

Fence was already in place upon purchase in 1929

.

Fence by the court's own language was used as a boundary at least until 1975

The Weitz family claims ownership of the disputed property because of Consuelo
Weitz's family history and associationwith the property. Mrs. Weitz's father, Harold
Schoepflin, and her grandfather, Fred Schoepflin, previously ran dairy cattle on the
disputed property. It appear this was done until about 1975. Prior to that time the
Schoepflins treated the disputed property as their own. They graded the trail in
question at will and connected it with numerous other roads traversing their property
to the north. They maintained the fence, which encroached on the Rogers' property.
During the 1970's Homer Ferguson leased theRogers' property from InezRogers, the
Rogers' family matriarch, to run cattle on it. Mr. Ferguson testified that Mrs. Rogers
told him in the mid-1970's that the fence, which borders the disputed property,
constituted the boundary between the Schoepflins' property and the Rogers' property.

R Vol. VI, p. 1352.

.
.
.

The Weitzes presented a tremendous amount of testimony concerning their
usage, possession, and ownership of the disputed property
The Weitzes even went to the extent of leasing the property to the County1
City in 1963, for a 10-year time period.
The Weitzes allowed the natural growth of the forest north of the disputed
properly line whereas the Rogers clear cut the property and grazed cattle
south of the property line, which is, again, manifested by Plaintiffs #40-B,
the aerial view which shows the dramatic difference in usage of the

.
.

properties in question. This aerial was taken in 1983.
Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 is dated 1995 and reflects the road in question as does
Plaintiffs Exhibit #32, which also reflects the disputed road in question.
Plaintiffs Exhibits #34 and #35 reflect the road in question in the year 2003.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

The appellants' claim for boundary by agreement and/or acquiescence, estoppel and

latches, prescriptive easement, and quasi estoppel were incorrectly dismissed by the District Judge.
2.

The appellants' motion to amend to allow a claim for adverse possession was

incorrectly denied.
3.

The quieting of title to defendantslrespondents was also in error as was the failure to

quiet title in the name of the appellants on the basis that the defendants are estopped from
challenging said title.
4.

The Court's finding of Slander of Title and the awarding of attorney fees and costs

to the respondents is not appropriate.
5.

The finding of trespass as to Gerald E. Weitz and Consuelo J. Weitz and the award

of damages against them was also in error.
6.

The appellants' claim for trespass and damages was incorrectly dismissed by the

District Judge.
ATTORNEY'S PEES ON APPEAL
The Weitzes hereby request their attorney's fees and costs associated with this appeal

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and Idaho Code $ 12-121 and 12-120 on appeal and
upon remand, that they be declared the prevailing party and the lower court make a determination
as to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The conduct of Mr. Green throughout cries out for
the award of attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT AND/OR
ACQUIESCENCE, ESTOPPEL AND LATCHES, PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT,
AND OUASI ESTOPPEL WERE INCORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE DISTRICT
It is well established in Idaho that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, or agreement,

requires:

. . . that there be a dispute, uncertainty or ignorance of the true boundary line which
was resolved by an agreement establishing the boundary that would be recognized.
The existence of an agreement relating to a boundary must be established. Such an
agreement could be established by direct evidence, or could be inferred from the
conduct of the parties or their predecessors, including long acauiescence in an
existing fence line.
ITewmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916,920,693 P.2d 1118,1122 (Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added) ("Furthermore, the period of acquiescence [with regard to a fence] is regarded as
competent evidence of the agreement.") Once a boundary line has been fixed under this doctrine,
"that boundary is binding upon successors in interest who purchase with notice of the agreement.
The general rule is that one purchasing property is put on notice as to any claim of title or right of
possession which a reasonable investigation would reveal." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264,271,

See also Vandehey Dev. Co. v. Suarez, 814 P.2d 1094,1096 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("Whether or not
defendants made inquiry, they are charged with notice of every fact that a reasonable inquiry would
have disclosed.").
One who purchases property with such notice "does not take in good faith, and one who fails
to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith." Langroise v.

Becker, 96 Idaho 218,220,526 P.2d 178,180 (1974). In other words, "one cannot be a good faith
purchaser. . . when a reasonable investigation of the property would have revealed the existence of
the conflicting claim in question." Id. at 221,526 P.2d at 181. A purchaser's duty to investigate has
been described as follows:
(O)ne having notice of facts which would put aprudent man on inquiry is chargeable
with knowledge of other facts which he might have discovered by diligent inquiry.
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard is notice
of everything to which such inquiry might have led and every unusual circuinstance
is a ground of suspicion and demands investigation.

Schlenz v. Dzierzynski, 481 N.E. 2d 287,290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), quoting Reedv. Eastin, 41 N.E.
2d 765,768 (Ill. 1942). See also Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 291 A.2d 662,669 (Md. Ct. App.
1972) ("A purchaser cannot fail to investigate when the propriety of the investigation is naturally
suggested by circuinstai~cesknown to him."). The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate
that the Greens were put on notice of the Weitz family's interest in the properly, failed to conduct
a reasonable inquiry, and therefore cannot claim protection as bona fide purchasers for value.
Before purchasing property from the Rogers Family Trust, Mr. Green walled much ofthe
property in question numerous times. He traversed the barbed wire fence and fence posts of the

disputed fence, even noticing the yellow barrel with a fence post in it. In Herrmann v. Woodell, the
Idaho Court of Appeals found that purchasers ofreal property who had "walked all over the property
and noticed the barbed wire fence" were "on notice of the agreed boundary." 107 Idaho at 921,693
P.2d at 1123.
The cowl makes much of the fact that the fence was dilapidated and had fallen into disrepair,
noting that "it would have been more descriptive to refer to it as the remains of a fence."
R Vol. VIII, p. 1640. I-Iowever, the fact is that the fence was visible enough that Mr. Green, by his
own testimony, noticed it as he traversed the property. In Mullahey v. Serra, 264 N.W. 63 (Iowa
1935), the appellants argued that the purported boundary line "was not occupied by a fence" when
they purchased the adjacent property. 264 N.W. at 64. The Iowa Supreme Court noted that there
was "evidence that one or more of the posts from the fence were still there" and found that the
boundary line "was so marked as to give ample notice that it was the line to which the adjoining
owners occupied." Id. See also Humble Oil & Rejning Co. v. Davis, 287 S.W. 104,108 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926) (evidence sufficient to find that appellant "lcnew, or by the exercise of any care would
have known, of the existence of the old established division line" and was "not authorized to
disregard this line and establish a new line").
Mr. Shook noticed the disputed fence line 19 times:

Q.

Okay. Along the fence line you located a minimum of 19 points that you
thought significant enough to photograph; is that correct?

A.

There's 19, yes.

Tr Vol. II,p. 1482, LL.16-19.

In addition, most of the witnesses called by the defendants knew of the fence line.
An old radio shack was also clearly visible during Mr. Green's visits to the disputedproperty.

The existence of structures on real property has been held to constitute notice to purchasers of a
conflicting interest in the property. Reid v. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389,94 P.3d 694 (2004); Campbell v.
Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052 (1952). In Reid v. Duzet, the Idaho Supreme Court found that
where a purchaser ''knew or should have known that there existed structures" upon the disputed
property, she had "notice that someone else claimed" that portion of the property. 140 Idaho at 393,
94 P.3d at 698. Eve11though the purchaser did not know of the previous agreement regarding the
boundary, because the structuresprovided ainple notice ofthe agreement, she was accordingly bound
by it. Id. at 393-94, 94 P.3d at 698-99.
As with the barbed wire fence, the court enlphasized the condition of the radio shack in
determining whether the Greens were bona fide purchasers, stating, "The shack is a dilapidated
structure that has not been used in decades. To the extent it was seen prior to purchase, it would not
have put a purchaser on notice of a contrary claim to ownership." R Vol. VIII, p. 1642. Existing
structures upon a disputed area of property need not be new or in good condition in order to put a
purchaser on notice of a conflicting claim of ownership. Certainly the existence of a radio shack on
property the Greens thought they were purchasing would be unusual enough to "excite" the Greens'
"attention" and prompt further inquiry. Schlenz, 481 N.E. 2d at 290, quotingReed, 41 N.E. 2d at 768
("every unusual circumstance is a ground of suspicion and demands investigation").

Despite the presence of the barbed wire fence and radio shack, both of which were clearly
visible during Mr. Green's visits to the property, in addition to the other indications of a conflicting
interest (roads that did not connect to the land they were purchasing, and the blue gate and hog wire
fence), the Greens conducted no investigation. The failure to investigate was neither reasonable nor
prudent under such circumstances. The law demands only a "reasonable investigation." Langvoise,
96 Idaho 218 at 221,526 P.2d at 181. Simply malung inquiries of the seller and adjacent neighbors
would have been reasonable under the circumstances; however, the Greens made no such inquiries.
Because the Greens had notice of a conflicting claim, they are "chargeable with knowledge of other
facts" that "might have [been] discovered by diligent inquiry." Schlenz, 48 1N.E. 2d at 290, quoting
Reed, 41 N.E. 2d at 768. Any such inquiry would have revealed the Weitzes' claim to the property.
Accordingly, the Greens are not entitled to protection as bona fide purchasers for value.
The presence of a fence and radio shack on the disputed property, even in their dilapidated
condition, combined with the other indications that the property was being used by the adjacent
owners, was sufficient to put the Greens on notice of an inconsistent claim to the property. Because
the Greens failed to conduct a reasonable investigatioii of such claim, they are not entitled to
protection as bona fide purchasers.
The trial court viewed the premises and bases much of its original Memorandum Decision
(see R Vol. VI, p. 1356) upon its view of the premises. The court fails to note that it viewed the
premises in the fall of 2005, whereas Mr. Green would have viewed the premises for three years
from 1999 to 2002. It should be noted that it was in 1995 that Mr. Green moved to the Viola area

and when he first started visiting the property is uncertain. Given the growth of underbrush, fallen
trees, etc., the chances for change ofcircumstances are tremendous, and none ofwhich are taken into
account by the trial court.
When discussing the perimeter road, the court made a startling observation: "The trail 011 the
property was really nothing more than a foot path." R Vol. VI, p. 1356; Vol. VIE, p. 1642.
The court fails to explain how Plaintiffs Exhibits #3 1 thru #34, which were taken in the year
2003, clearly show a road.
It is also confusing to note how Plaintiffs Exhibit #37 presents a series ofphotographs of the
perimeter and road in question from beginning to end. These were taken just a couple of months
before the trial Judge visited the premises. Even these photographs show a distinct and discernable
road that traversed the entire length of the disputed property in question and constituted something
far more significantthan a "foot path." Again, the court fails to explain how its view of the premises
in the fall of 2005 had anything to do with how the premises looked from 1999 to 2002 when

Mr. Green was admittedlyon the disputedproperty in question, driving his four-wheeler, with its 46"
wheel base, back and forth across the perimeter road many, many times.
Perhaps this is why the Idaho Supreme Court, in Akers v. Movtensen,

P.3d -,

2008

WL 2266993 (Idaho) (citing Tyson Creek R.R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 590, 174 P.
1004, 1007 (1918) (presently an unpublished opinion) stated:

. . . We conclude that the district court's reliance on its site view was error. It is well
established in Idaho that the knowledge obtained by a jury view of a premises can
only be used to determined the weight and applicability of the evidence introduced

at trial and that a view of the premises "is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict
may he based." . . . .

Id. at *4. The Court goes on to state that the difference between a jury view and a court view as:
"for purposes of appellate review, there is no analytical difference between a jury view and a court
view." Id.
In the present case, the trial court brushes away the significance of the road, the radio shack,
the swath through the trees, the large blue steel gate, and then ignores entirely Mr. Greens' failure
to talk to the Weitzes, or any of the neighbors, or to even walk the boundary of his property, or to
even make inquiry with the previous owner as to the boundary, to make inquiry with his realtor, or
to make inquiry with any of the three surveyors with whom he had contact.
11.

THE APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND TO ALLOW A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE
POSSESSION WAS INCORRECTLY DENIED, AND THE FAILURE TO AWARD
WEITZES TITLE TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY BASED UPON ADVERSE
POSSESSION WAS IN ERROR.
The elements of adverse possession in Idaho are set forth in Idaho Code 5 5-210 which did

require five (5) continuous years of possession, hut as of 2006, it now requires 20 years of
possession. Thus, at the time ofthe commencement ofthis action, however, the applicable statutory
period required for adverse possession was five (5) years. Payment of taxes is not an issue in this
case, as the government lot exception applies.
Idaho's appellate courts have held:
Idaho Code 5 5-210 requires actual payment of taxes assessed with regard to the
disputed property. (citations omitted) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the payment of taxes requirement imposed by

statute. (Citations omitted) Several exceptions to this requirement exist and have the
effect of satisfying the tax payment requirement. . . . .
The lot number exception states: "[Iln the case of boundary disputes between
contiguous landowners, where one landowner can establish continuous open,
notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's land, and
taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, rather than
by metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the
disputed tract is enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the ... statute."
(Citations omitted). The reason behind the lot number exception is that "when taxes
are assessed according to some generic description, 'it is impossible to determine
from the tax assessment record the precise quantum of property being assessed.' "
(Citation omitted).
Wilson v. Gladish, 140 Idaho 861,865,103 P.3d 474,478 (Ct. App. 2004)
Thus, the "lot number" exception applies in cases involving contiguous properties where
taxes have been assessed based on lot number or government survey rather than on a physical
inspection or measurement or by metes and bounds. When the "lot number" exception applies, the
payment of taxes requirement is satisfied where the adverse possessor has paid the taxes on his lot
or parcel, and the taxes on the disputed property have been paid by the neighboring landowner.
Roark v. Bentley, 139 Idaho 793, 796-797, 86 P.3d 507, 510-51 1 (2004). Also, a review of the
affidavit of Steve A. Fiscus, the tax assessor for Latah County from 1989 until 2005, states:
6.
On the tax assessment valuations, when you see, for example 160 acres, that
is just the tax assessor's estimate of the number of acres in a given quarter section,
but your affiant can represent to you without any doubt that said acreage is an
estimate and is not accurate. The boundary between the two properties in question
was not located by tax assessors for tax assessment purposes.
7.
If the property that is being assessed is not given a specific metes and bounds
description, then the exact boundaries of the property of the respective landowners
is a matter of guesstimatingand the amount of acreage within a quarter section is also

a matter of guesstimating. The exact quantum of property being assessed is
impossible to determine from the tax assessment records. The exact location of the
section line or quarter section line is unknown for tax assessment purposes.
R Vol. 111, pp. 720-721.
The Weitz family asserts that it acquired title to the disputed property through adverse
possession, as the family occupied the property continuously for the statutory period, and the
property was protected by a substantial enclosure, or fence, which was maintained by the Weitzes
from 1929 until 1975. Had the court permitted the Weitzes' adverse possession claim to proceed,
it would have been constrained to consider the nature and character of the family's possession and
use of the property for this entire period, rather than just the five years preceding the commencement
of the action. Crarner v. Walker, 23 Idaho 495, 130 P. 1002 (1913).

In Cramer v. Walker, the plaintiff purchased a parcel of land in 1881 and built a residence
that stood on his parcel and also extended about 8 to 10 feet onto the adjacent parcel. Id., 23 Idaho
at 496,130 P. at 1003. The plaintiffpaid the taxes on the property continuously from the time of the
purchase of his parcel in 1881. Id. However, the defendant, who purchased the adjacent property,
and his predecessor also paid taxes on the same property continuously after 1889. Id. 111examining
the plaintiff's adverse possession claim, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff "had paid
the taxes for at least five years continuously" before the defendant or his predecessor ever paid taxes
on the property. Id. "It is clear, therefore," the court stated, "that, under the statute and the wellestablished rules of law applicable to acquiring title by adverse possession, [the plaintiff] had
acquired the title to this property prior to June 29, 1889, the date on which [the defendant's

predecessor] paid the first taxes." Id. The court specifically noted that the plaintiffs title to the
property by adverse possession was then "perfect" and any payment of taxes thereafter by the
original owner of the legal title "would not alter [the] condition of' the plaintiffs title. Id. Most
notably, the Cmmer court stated,
Under a claim of title to property by adverse possession, authorized by section 4043,
Rev. Codes, it is not necessam that the five years' continuous. exclusive, adverse
possession and payment of taxes should have been immediately ~recedinethe
commencemeilt of the action, or at any special or particular time, but it is sufficient
if the party claiming such title can establish anv continuous five-vex period prior to
commencement of the action and subsequent to the acquisition of the legal title by
the adverse party during which he has complied with the statute in maintaining his
open, notorious, adverse possession, and payment of taxes for such period.

23 Idaho at 496, 130 P. at 1003 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Cvamer court also noted that
once such a five-year period is complete, the party acquiring title by adverse possession "is under
no more obligation to pay the taxes thereafter than he would be on any other property. In other
words, the subsequent payment of taxes aRer the adverse title is complete is no longer necessary or
essential to successfully defend or prosecute an action in support of such title." Id. Applying this
concept to the present case, it stands to reason that if the Weitzes (or their predecessors) maintained
the fence on the disputed property for any continuous five-year period prior to 1975, their title to the
property by adverse possession would be perfected, and maintenance of the fence thereafter would
no longer be necessary to successfully defend such title.
The court's original Memorandum Decision, dated January 9,2006, appears to support the
conclusion that the Weitzes and its predecessors did, in fact, satisfy the requirements of adverse

possession of the disputed property between the years 1929 and 1975. The court specifically notes
that the Schoepflins treated the disputed property as their own prior to 1975, grading a trail on the
property, and maintaining the fence that encroaches onto the Rogers property. R Vol. VI, p. 1352.
However, the court seems to have focused primarily on the condition of the fence subsequent to
2002, noting that the fence "was, in 2002, for all intents and purposes, non-existent." R Vol. VI,
p. 1354. The court further states, "In the summer of 2005, when this Court walked the length of the
'fence,' it would have been more descriptive to refer to it as the remains of a fence than to refer to
it as a 'fence."' Id. The court also noted that this "'fence' would not have constituted notice of
anything to anyone." Id.
Had the court allowed the Weitzes' adverse possession claim to proceed, however, the
condition of the fence subsequent to 2002 would have been irrelevant in light of the evidence, which
supports the conclusion that the Weitzes and its predecessors had perfected title to the disputed
property by adverse possession prior to 1975. Idaho courts have referred to such perfecting of title
by adverse possession as "ripened title." Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700,703-704,963 P.2d 383,
386-87 (1998), citing Larson v. Lindsay, 80 Idaho 242,250,327 P.2d 775,780 (1958). In Lavson

v. Lindsay, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Fundamentally, the rule that ancient fences may constitute legal boundaries, is
immutably predicated upon a clear and satisfactory showing of adverse possession
of the disputed premises. . . . The fence cases referred to are clearly distinguishable
on the facts and the law applicable thereto, from the instant case. All of thein
recognize the theory of ripened title to premises in one who has actually occupied and
claimed the same up to an asserted boundary fence, openly, notoriously and
adversely, for the statutory period of time or more, under such circumstances that the

record title owners and successors knew or ought to have known of such occupancy.
80 Idaho at 250, 327 P.2d at 780 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). This concept of
ripened title confonns to the concept in Idaho, and in other jurisdictions, that title acquired by
adverse possession is considered valid, legal title to the property. See, e.g., Oakley Valley Stone, Inc.
v. Alastua, 110 Idaho 265,268,715 P.2d 935,938 (1985) (the doctrine of adverse possession refers

to acquisition of apossessory interest in land and, if proved, results in the transfer of legal title to the
adverse claimant). See also 39 AMJUR POF 2d 261 5 1 ("If property has been held 'adversely' for
the required number of years, and if all of the other requirements for adverse possession has been
fulfilled, the title to that property acquired by the adverse possessor is an absolute title in fee simple,
and it is as valid and as effective as a deed from the original owner.") Accordingly, if title to the
disputed property had already ripened in favor of the Weitzes or their predecessors prior to 1975, the
condition of the fence subsequent to 1975 would have no effect on such title.
Indeed, once such title is perfected, even the subsequent removal of the fence would not
divest the adverse possessor of such title. Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258 (1973). In

Scott v. Gubler, the plaintiff constructed a fence on her property in 1959 which enclosed not only
her lot, but also a portion of the adjacent lot. Id. at 442, 51 1 P.2d at 259. The plaintiff and her
husband used all of the land up to the fence line as their own from 1959 until 1968, when the
defendants removed the fence. Id. In concluding that the plaintiff had acquired title to the disputed
property by adverse possession, the court stated, "the physical presence of [the plaintiffs] fence for
nine years, as well as [the plaintiffs] open, visible and contiituous use of all the land south of the

fence, including the disputedparcel, provided ample notice to [the defendants]." Id. at 445,5 11 P.2d
at 262. Similarly, in the present case, the Weitzes' open, visible, and continuous use of the disputed
property and their maintenance of the fence from 1929 to 1975 should have resulted in legal title to
the property vesting in the Weitzes by 1975, notwithstanding the fact that the fence later fell into
disrepair. See also, Jackman v. Germain, 165 P. 78 (Wash. 1917) (evidence that defendant built a
fence, cleared land up to it, and for over 10 years maintained such fence, establishes title by adverse
possession, despite the fact that the fence was later removed)
It appears that the Weitzes have satisfied the requirements of adverse possession in this case.
Had the court allowed the Weitzes' adverse possession claiin to proceed, it should have concluded
(based on its own statement of the evidence) that the Weitzes acquired legal title to the disputed
property prior to 1975. Accordingly, the condition of the fence in 2002, or in 2005 when the court
walked the property, would be irrelevant, as the fact that the fence had fallen into disrepair would
not have the effect of divesting the Weitzes of its legal title to the property.
Washington courts also recognize the concept o f 'ripened title" as it applies to acquiring title
to real property by adverse possession.

In El Cevvito, Inc. v. Ryndak, 376 P.2d 528 (Wash. 1962), the Washington Supreme Court
stated:
When real property has been held by adverse possession for ten years, such
possession rivens into an original title. Title so acquired by the adverse possessor
cannot be divested bv acts other than those reauired where title was acauiredbvdeed.
. . . The person so acquiring this title can convey it to another party without having
had title quieted in him prior to the conveyance. Once a person has title (which was

acquired by him or his predecessor by adverse possession), the ten-vear statute of
limitations does not reauire that the property be continuouslv held in an adverse
manner up to the time his title is auieted in a lawsuit. He may bring his action at any
time after possession has been held adversely for ten years.
376 P.2d at 532-33 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Jackman v. Germain, 165 P. 78 (Wash. 1917), the Washington Supreme Court affirmed
a judgment quieting title in the grantees of an adverse possessor who had built a boundary fence in
1900, cleared the land up to that line, and maintained the fence for more than ten years. 165 P. at
80. Despite the fact that the fence was later tom down, the court noted that "adverse possession for
the statutory time, under a mistaken belief that a fence enclosing the land was on the true boundary
line, with claim of ownership during such period, ripens into title bv adverse possession." Id.
(emphasis added).
Similarly, other courts within theNinth Circuit recognize this concept that title automatically
vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period. See, e.g., Marriage v. Keener, 31
Cal. Rptr. 2d 51 1 , s14 (Cal. Ct. App. l994), quoting Williamsv. Rogiev, 61 1 N.E. 2d 189,196 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993) ("Fee simple title vests in the adverse possessor by operation of law at the moment
the requisite conditions for adverse possession have been established for the statutory period.");

Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984) ("title automatically vests in the adverse
possessor at the end of the statutoryperiod"); Bubo v. Bookbinder Financial Corp., 551 P.2d 63,64
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) ("Title vests at the end of the adverse possession period."). For example, the
Oregon Supreme Court noted:

. . . if the land is in the possession of another and if the possessors' occupation of the
land meets the requirements for adverse possession, that is, if the occupiers'
possession is sufficiently conspicious so that the true owner should have asserted his
rights, the title holders' nonassertion of rights will result in eliminating his interest
in the property and transferring that interest to the possessor. The adverse possessor
then acquires "perfect title" to the land.

Evans v. Hogue, 681 P.2d 1133,1139 (Or. 1984).
Most courts also recognize that the adverse possessor need not file an action to gain title;
rather, the burden is on the record title holder to assert his claim before the expiration of the
limitation period. The California Court of Appeal stated:
Fee simple title vests in the adverse possessor by operation of law at the moment the
requisite conditions for adverse possession have been established for the statutory
period. The adverse possessor is not required to take any further steps to acquire title
once those conditions have been met. The statute of limitations runs against the title
holder, not the adverse claimant.

Marriage v. Keener, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51 1, at 514, quoting Williams v. Rogier, 611 N.E. 2d at 196
(internal citations omitted). See also Bubo v. Bookbinder Financial Corp., 551 P.2d at 64 ("Court
action is not necessary to perfect title" by adverse possession.).
Likewise, once title has vested in the adverse possessor by operation of law, subsequent
actions by the former record title holder will not divest the adverse possessor of such title. Overson

v. Cowley, 664 P.2d 210, 220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), citing Fritts v. Ericson, 436 P.2d 582, (Ariz.
1968) ("Assuming title by adverse possession was acquired in October 1971, subsequent efforts by
the [record title holders] to effect a re-entry would be to no avail."). This also means that once title
has ripened in the adverse possessor, he need not persist in exhibiting all of the statutory elements

of adverse possession continuously up to the time a lawsuit is filed. See, e.g., Marriage v. Keener,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514, quoting 7 Powell on Real Property (1994) 7 1017,91-109 through 91-111)
(title acquired by adverse possession "may not be divested. . . by mere failure to assert title after it
has been perfected").
In Mugaas v. Smith, 206 P.2d 332 (Wash. 1949), an appeal was taken froin the trial court's
finding that Mugaas had acquired title to a disputed strip of property through adverse possession.
The Washington Supreme Court stated:
The only serious questions raised by this appeal are attributable lo the fact that the
fence which between 1910 and 1928 clearly marked the boundary line for which
respondent contends, disappeared by a process of disintegration in the years which
followed, and, when appellants purchased the property in 1941 by a legal description
and with a record title which included the disputed strip, there was no fence and
nothing to mark the dividing line between the property of appellants and respondent,
or to indicate to the appellants that the respondent was claiming title to the strip in
question.
206 P.2d at 333. 11 affirming the trial court's judgment, the Washington Supreme Court specifically
stated, "The fact that the respondent had ceased to use the strip in question in such a way that her
claim of adverse possession was apparent did not divest her of the title she had acquired." Id. at 334.
Accordingly, in the present case the fact that the fence had fallen into disrepair sometime after 1975
would be irrelevant, as would the trial court's observation that in the summer of 2005, the remains
of this "'fence' would not have constituted notice of anything to auyone." R, Vol. VI, p. 1354.
Finally, in Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14 (Alaska 20011, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that
a "purchaser of land from the record owner does not have a cause of action against an adverse

possessor whose title has already ripened; rather, the purchaser's remedy lies in an action against the
person who sold the adversely possessed land." 35 P.3d at 22, n.24, citing 17 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts 5 50,274-583 (4thed. 2000). Accordingly, one could argue that because title
to the disputed property had ripened in the Weitzes by at least 1975, the Greens should have no cause
of action against the Weitzes; rather, the Greens should look to the Rogers Family Trust for
compensation, and the evidence demonstrates that they have already done so.
Leave to Amend

As noted in Weitzes' briefs in support of their motions for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to amend their complaint, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that
leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . ."The Idaho Supreme
Court has held that:
The twin purposes behind the rule are to allow claims to be determined on the merits
rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings serve the limited role of
providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue. Clark v. Olsen, 110
Idaho 323,326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986).
CurlH. ChristensenFamily Trust, 133Idaho 866,871,933 P.2d 1197,1202 (1999). Inkeeping with
those "twin purposes" - and with the plain language of the Rule- the Idaho Supreme Court has held:
"[I]n the interest ofjustice, district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint."
Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853,934 P.2d 20,26 (1997).
The discretion to amend must be exercised within the bounds of the plain language and
purposes ofthe Rule and the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule:

"If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the
merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the
leave sought should, as the rules require, 'be freely given."'

Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,326,715 P.2d 993,996 (1986), quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182,83 S. Ct. 227,230,9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962). Furthermore:
As long as the proposed amendment states avaIid claim, a court may not consider the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. D u t n v. Idaho Crop
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,1013,895 P.2d 1195,1206 (1995). Sufficiency
of evidence is more properly determined at the summary judgment stage. Id.
Because the district court improperly considered the sufficiency of the evidence,
it abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to amend.

Carl H. Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho 866,872,933 P.2d 1197,1203 (1999). R Vol. JII, pp.

111.

THE QUIETING OF TITLE TO DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS WAS ALSO IN
ERROR AS WAS THE FAILURE TO QUIET TITLE IN THE NAME OF THE
APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED
FROM CHALLENGING SAID TITLE
The Weitzes assert that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel should apply in this case and that the

Greens should be estopped from asserting title to the disputed property because they obtained a
reduction in purchase price (in the amount' of $46,247.16) from their grantor, the Rogers Family
Trust. In other words, the Weitzes argue that it would be unconscionable for the Greens to claim
ownership of the disputed property when the Greens have essentially obtained a refund for this
property.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable advantage,
or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing positions." Garner
v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,437,80P.3d 1031,1038 (2003), citingLunders v. Estate ofsnyder, 131
Idaho 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372, 378 (1998). The doctrine is applicable under the following
circumstances:
[I]t precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent
with apositionpreviously taken by him or her. The doctrine applies where it would
be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in
which he acquiesced or ofwhich he accepted a benefit. The act of the party against
whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or
produced some disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel must
have been induced to change his position.

Garner, 139 Idaho at 437, 80 P.3d at 1038, quoting Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v.
Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402,410,987 P.2d 314,322 (1999).
This is not acase in which the Weitzes have been induced to change their position. However,
the Greens have gained an advantage or benefit by obtaining a reduction in the purchase price from
the Rogers Family Trust. Further, that by claiming title to the disputed property now, the Greens
are asserting a position inconsistent with one in which they accepted a benefit. In other words, by
accepting a substantial reduction in purchase price from the Rogers Family Trust the Greens
aclcnowledged that they did not receive clear title to the disputed property.
Because quasi-estoppel:
is an equitable doctrine, its application depends upon a case-by-case analysis of the
equities involved, rather than upon precise definitional standards. In determining
quasi estoppel issues, the court should consider whether the party asserting an

inconsistent position has benefitted or produced a detriment by the first position, the
magnitude of the inconsistency, and whether the first position was asserted with full
knowledge of the facts.
31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver 5 120. Some courts have also articulated the "magnitude of the
inconsistency" factor as "whether the inconsistency was of such significance as to make the present
assertion unconscionable." Wright v. Alaslza, 824 P.2d 718, 721 (Alaska 1992). It has also been
stated, appropriately, that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel "is based upon the principle that one cannot
blow both hot and cold." Estate ofAnderson v. Babb-Free, 60 Cal. App. 4" 436,442 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997), quoting Estate ofDavis, 38 Cal. App. 2d 579, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940); see also Estate of
Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 221 (Alaska 1995), quoting Godoy v. County of Hawaii, 354 P.2d 78, 82
(Haw. 1960).
The applicability of quasi-estoppel "turns upon the specific facts and circumstances of the
case under consideration." WilliamsLake Lands, k c . v. LeMoyne Development, Inc., 108Idaho 826,
829,702 P.2d 864,867 (Ct. App. 1985), citing KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,486 P.2d 992
(1971). The specific facts and circumstances surrounding the Greens' pre-litigation conduct justify
the application of quasi-estoppel in this case.
It is clear that the Greens benefitted from their settlement with the Rogers Family Trust. In
his affidavit, Mr. Green states,
7. The Rogers Agreement did not pay me for any property, or for any property
damage. I have never received compensation from Rogers for the property that
Weitz claims. I did not sell land to Rogers, and Rogers did not buy land from me in
that agreement. The agreement did not involve a payment to me for the loss of any
land.

Plaintiffs Exhibit #44. However, Mr. Green's assertions are false and are contrary to the testimony
elicited at trial and also contrary to the correspondence sent on his behalf by his attorney to the
attorney for the Rogers Family Trust. The Greens' attorney calculated the settlement amount as
follows:
Repay Dan Castle - Tract 1
1.91 acres @ $4,000.00/acre =

$7,640.00

Repay Steve and Mary Shook - Tract 2
3.66 acres @ $4,745.82/acre =

17,369.70

Loss of value of Green's parcel - Tract 3
3 acres @ $4,745.82/acre =

14,237.46

Cost to re-survey property and
Re-write legal descriptions
Legal fees
TOTAL DAMAGESICOSTS

1 $46,247.16 1

Plaintiffs Exhibit #48. This correspondence reveals that the settlement amount of $46,247.16 was
specifically calculated on a per-acre basis. In other words, despite the Greens' characterization of
the settlement, the payment did, in fact, represent "compensation from Rogers for the property that
Weitz claims." Plaintiffs Exhibit #44. As noted above, in determining whether quasi-estoppel
should apply, some courts consider "whether the inconsistency was of such significance as to make
the present assertion unconscionable." Wright, 824 P.2d at 721. In this case, the Greens' acceptance
of a per-acre refund in the amount of $46,247.16 is so significant as to make their present assertion
of title to the disputed property unconscionable.

In describing the settlement agreement, Mr. Green also states, "The Rogers agreement was
not a compensation for land, because at the time I entered into the agreement with Rogers on
August 5,2003 regarding Rogers' duty to defend my title, I already had acquired a contractual duty
to defend the titles of Shooks and Castles." Plaintiffs Exhibit #44. While Mr. Green's statement is
technically correct, it does not reflect the reality that the Greens voluntarily entered into such
contractual duties with the Shooks and Castles "with full knowledge of the facts" surrounding the
Weitzes' claim. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver 3 120. The Greens were fully aware of the Weitzes'
claim to the disputed property before they entered into sale agreements with the Shooks and Castles.
The Greens had entered into discussions with the Rogers Family Trust with regard to the Weitzes'
claim at least as early as March 2003. Plaintiffs Exhibit #46. Again, the per-acre amounts
represented in the Shook and Castle agreements are dollar-for-dollar the same as those used in
calculating the settlement with the Rogers Family Trust. Plaintiffs Exhibit #44.
Taking all ofthese facts into consideration, it is clear that in finding that quasi-estoppel was
not applicable, the court placed too much emphasis on the Greens' contractual obligations to the
Shooks and Castles, as well as the Greens' characterization of the settlement as a mere reduction in
purchase price that was intended to compensate the Greens for the trouble of having to defend title
to the disputed property. In reality, the Greens used the merits of the Weitzes' claim to obtain a
substantial refund fiom the Rogers Family Trust, via a settlement agreement that was to remain
confidential, and then turned around and attempted to obtain a double recovery by also having title
to the property quieted in themselves. It has been said that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel "appeals

to the conscience of the court to prevent injustice." Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1223
(Alaska 2005). See also Estate ofAndevson, 60 Cal. App. 4that 440 ("The foundation of estoppel
is justice and good conscience."); Estate oflampert, 896 P.2d at 221, quoting University ofHawaii
Professional Assembly v. University ofHawaii, 659 P.2d 720,726 (Haw. 1983) ("Estoppel by any

name is based primarily on considerations ofjustice and fair play."). The doctrine should be applied
in this case to prevent the injustice of the Greens receiving a double recovery.
That the Greens have a legal right to assert their claim against the Weitzes should not
dissuade the court from applying estoppel in this case. Estoppel applies "to prevent a person from
asserting a right which has come into existence by contract, statute or other rule of law where,
because of his conduct, silence, or omission, it would be unconscionable to allow him to do so."
Estate ofAnderson, 60 Cal. App. 4" at 443, quoting Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 188

(Cal. Ct. App. 1969). Further, while it is clear that the doctrine does not apply in cases where the
party has received an indirect benefit, In re Estate ofDolores, 141 Idaho 177,183,108 P.3d 324,330
(2005), in this case, the Greens specifically sought compensation on a per-acre basis and received
a direct benefit in the amount of $46,247.16. They now seek to assert a contrary position in order
to obtain an additioilal benefit - title to the disputed property for which they have already been
compensated.
The doctrine of quasi-estoppelhas been applied to transactions and agreements involving real
property. Williams Lake Lands, 108 Idaho 826, 702 P.2d 864; Dressel v. Weeks, 779 P.2d 324
(Alaska 1989). In Dressel v. Weeks, the Alaska Supreme Court specifically held that "the doctrine

of quasi estoppel may be applied to divest legal title to real property from the title holder of record
where the title holder knowingly benefitted from a transaction involving the property which runs
counter to the interest sought to be asserted." 779 P.2d at 333. In that case, Dressel purchased a
cabin from Dorothy Kuhns, a wealthy woman with whom he had lived for several years. Kuhns
executed a warranty deed to the cabin, which Dressel recorded in 1980. In 1983, however, Kuhns
and Dressel agreed that "Kuhns would 'take back' the cabin from Dressel and in return she would
bequeath to hiin the house they lived in." Id. at 326. This agreement was not put in writing, and
Kuhns failed to have Dressel deed the cabin back to her. Id. Later that year, Kuhns sold the cabin
to the defendant, Marion Weeks. The preliminary title report failed to show the deed from I W s
to Dressel, and Dressel was aware of the sale to Weeks but never asserted an interest in the property.

Id. Kuhns died in 1985, leaving her home to Dressel as promised. When Weeks sought to quiet title
to the cabin, Dressel asserted his recorded legal title in defense and as a counterclaim. Id. at 327.

In finding that quasi-estoppel could be applied to "divest title in realty in spite of perfect record
title," the Dressel court noted that Dressel had "accepted the house as the bargained-for-benefit in
exchange for the return of the cabin that Kuhns had previously sold to Weeks." 779 P.2d at 331,
332. The court also remarked that the "common thread in the numerous cases applying [the doctrine
of quasi-estoppel] to real property is that the party to be estopped has received and accepted the
benefits flowing from a transaction or conveyance involving the property at issue." Id. at 332. In
the present case, there is no doubt that the Greens "received and accepted the benefits flowing" from
a settlement agreement "involving the property at issue." As in Dressel, the acceptance of such

benefits by the Greens should "preclude the assertion o f record title" to the disputed property. 779
P.2d at 332.
Under the specific facts o f this case, the elements o f quasi-estoppel are met, and justice
requires that the court apply the doctrine to prevent the Greens from asserting record title to the
disputed property,
IV.

THE COURT'S FINDING OF SLANDER OF TITLE AND THE AWARDING OF
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO THE RESPONDENTS IS NOT APPROPRIATE

That the court in its initial Memorandum Decision correctly set forth the elements that need
to be met on a slander o f title case. The trial court cited Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758,572 P.2d
861 (1977) and the court goes on to state:
The Weitz family had a good faith belief it had a valid claim to the disputed property.
Consequently, malice has not been shown.
R Vol. VI,p. 1360.

It is almost unimaginable to think that a family that has been in possession o f the property
in question since 1929 could possibly assert a claiin which would give rise to slander o f title.
V.

THE FINDING OF TRESPASS AS TO GERALD E. WEITZ AND CONSUELO J.
WEITZ AND THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AGAINST TIIEM WAS ALSO IN
ERROR

The facts o f the case show that the Weitzes were in possession o f the property in question
up to and including the disputed fence line since 1929. In the past, they have habitually repaired and
maintained the fence so as to enclose the dairy cattle. Idaho Code 56-202 does not contemplate
trespass by parties in possession o f the property, who have been in possession for over 70 years, to

immediately turn into "trespassers" of any sort simply because Mr. Green chose to purchase the
Rogers' property in 2002. It also must be noted that the repairing of the fence came at the time that
Mr. Green made his settlement with the Rogers family for the amount of $46,247.16.
VI.

THE APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR TRESPASS AND DAMAGES WAS
INCORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE
The Weitzes had possession and ownership of the property in question as per the adverse

possession claim and the boundary by acquiescence claims as discussed above. As such, the
dismissal by the Court of the Weitzes claim for trespassing damages was incorrectly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Weitzes hereby respectfully request this Court to:
1)

Determine that they are the proper owners and in possession of the property in

question by reason of the boundary by agreement andlor acquiescence argument, and/or that
Mr. Green is estopped from contesting the Weitzes' claim to the property in question, and that title
should be quieted to the appellants.
2)

Award them ownership, possession, and control of the property in question based

upon the adverse possession claim, due to the fact that all of the facts that are before this Court are
sufficient to establish such a ruling, and that title be quieted to the Weitzes. Or, in the alternative,
remand the matter to allow for the complaint to be amended as had been requested and for the
adverse possession claim to proceed accordingly.

3)

Dismiss the slander of title claim, and, thus, the award of attorney fees and costs for

reasons set forth above.
4)

Dismiss the finding of trespass against them and find that the award of damages was

done so in error.
5)

Find the Weitzes' claim for trespass and damages was incorrectly dismissed by the

lower Court.
6)

Award of attorney fees on appeal and also request they be deemed the prevailing

party, and that this matter be remanded in order to establish the appropriate amount of attorney fees
and costs by the lower court for handling the underlying matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of August, 2008.
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Charles A. Brown
Attorney for the PlaintiffsIAppellants
& Cross-Respondents

I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed
by regular first class mail, and deposited in the United States Post Office to:
Robert M. Magyar, Esq.
Magyar Law Firm, PLLC
201 N. Main St., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 8074
Moscow., ID 83843
on this 28th day of August, 2008.

Andrew M. Schwam, Esq.
Schwam Law Office
514 South Polk Street # 6
Moscow, ID 83843

